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1. Was the detainment of Spidle reasonable under the 
circumstances? 
2o Was the deputy sheriff's de minimis intrusion 
reasonable under the particular facts of this case? 
IV. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3 (2) (c) (1953 as 
amended) and Utah Code Ann. Section 77-35-26(2)(a) (1953 as 
amended) whereby a defendant in a criminal action may take an 
appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment of 
conviction of a Class A Misdemeanor. In the case at hand, 
final judgment and conviction were rendered by the Honorable 
Judge Michael L. Hutchingsf Fifth Circuit Court, Salt Lake 
Countyf Utah* 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Salt _~".c . .
 t -
approximately 9800 S . *--. *'\^ ^ East ^ii tck- :our/v 
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 n« ouserveu d vemcit •»- r " -.IT* 
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registered. Kennedy ^ _-_ ____ .ai ^,r at approximately 10th 
r . ; a s t I "'i III n i ! , ' M ) 'i',!"! • . . . : .. 
There were two people in the car, a driver and the 
passenger, Spidle. The driver smelled of alcohol and Kennedy 
noticed an empty beer can in the car. Therefore, Kennedy asked 
the driver to step out of the car. At this time James N. 
Richards a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff arrived, who, unlike 
Kennedy, was certified to check for intoxication by the 
horizontal gaze nystagmus method (p. 5, 6). At Kennedy's 
request, Richards conducted a field sobriety test on the driver 
while Kennedy checked the registration of the car and for a 
drivers license using the name the driver had given (p. 6). 
Kennedy checked with the State1 s Department of iMotor Vehicles 
computer and was told that the license plate on. the vehicle 
belonged on a 1972 Toyota. Kennedy then decided to impound the 
car (p. 7) . 
Approximatley twenty minutes had now elapsed, during 
which time Spidle remained seated on the passenger side of the 
car (p. 11). During those twenty minutes Richards briefly left 
for a couple of minutes to check out a reported nearby 
disturbance (p. 20). After Kennedy decided to impound the 
vehicle, he asked Richards to remove the passenger, Spidle, 
from the vehicle so that Richards could check the vehicle for 
more open containers, and so the vehicle could be impounded (p. 
7). Richards did not know the identity of the passenger, 
Spidle, until he asked Spidle to exit the vehicle (p. 21). 
Although, Richards had no prior personal contact with Spidle, 
upon learning Spidle1s name, Richards knew from other deputies 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DETENTION OF APPELLANT WAS PROPER 
SINCE THE OFFICER NOT ONLY HAD A REASONABLE 
SUSPICION OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY BUT FACED AN 
UNAVOIDABLE CONFRONTATION WITH APPELLANT. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects individuals against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The United States Supreme Court has had occassion to 
address what constitutes a reasonable search and recognizes 
that a police officer in appropiate circumstances and in an 
appropiate manner, can approach a person for a limited 
investigation without a warrant or probable cause. Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Furthermore, a brief detention of a 
person is proper, if the detaining officer has a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that the person is engaged in criminal 
activity. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
The mere fact that an officer request a person to 
perform an act or answer some questions does not by itself turn 
an encounter with an officer and citizen into a seizure. United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). In Mendenhall, the 
Court held that Federal narcotic agents who after asking a 
suspected drug courier some intitial questions, identified 
themselves as law enforcement officials and then asked the 
suspect to accompany them to their office wherein they asked if 
they could search the suspect, did not amount to a seizure 
since the suspect cooperated in a voluntary manner. The 
Mendenhall Court went on to state: 
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Even if the present case amounted to a seizure, the 
detention of Spidle was lawful. Pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and its identical 
counterpart, Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah, Utah has codified the Terry requirement that the 
detention of a person by police must be based on a reasonable 
suspicion that a public offense is either being committed or is 
being attempted of being committed. Utah Code Ann. Section 
77-7-15 (1953 as amended). 
In order for a seizure to be based on reasonable 
suspicion, the officer effectuating the detention must point to 
specific, a-rticulable facts, which, together with rational 
inferences drawn from those facts, would lead a reasonable 
person to conclude the person committed or was about to commit 
a crime. Terry v. Ohio, supra; State v. Swanigan, 669 P.2d 
718 (Utah 1985) . A Terry stop for traffic violations is also 
proper. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). 
The initial detention of Spidle was reasonable and 
based upon specific, articulable facts. Both Kennedy and 
Richards were aware that an open container of an alcoholic 
beverage was in the vehicle, which is a clear violation of 
U.C.A. Section 41-6-44.20 (1953 as amended). This violation 
itself is ample reason to seize Spidle. Viewing the fact that 
Spidle was clearly intoxicated and even admitted having too 
much to drink gave Richards plenty of articulable facts upon 
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which to seize Spidle in order to search the car to see if 
there were more open containers. 
Spidlefs reliance on Swanigan, supra, and State v. 
Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987), is hardly helpful to 
the present case. Swanigan dealt with over a two hour lapse in 
time between the crime and the police viewing two individuals 
walking down the street. Swanigan, supra. In the present case, 
the facts constituting the suspected unlawful conduct upon 
which Spidlefs seizure was based were viewed simultaneoulsy 
with Spidle!s seizure. In Trujillo, the defendant was seized 
while strolling down State Street late at night which is not an 
unusual occurrence. Truj illo, supra. Again, in the present 
case, Spidle was seized while in the very act of violating the 
open container statute. See, People v. Bradi, 437 N.E.2d 1285 
(111.App. 1982). 
Spidle1s assertion that he was seized based merely on 
his bad reputation, ignores the entire scope of attendant 
circumstances upon which the reasonableness of the seizure can 
be determined. Terry v. Ohio, supra. When viewing all the 
events preceding Richards asking Spidle to open his jacket, 
particularly the fact that Spidle was in violation of the open 
container statute, the request, whether it amounted to a 
seizure or not was reasonable. 
Although, the alleged seizure of Spidle was proper 
under the usual Terry and Brown analysis, it was also proper 
under the more particular application of seizure analysis 
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applied to the stopping of traffic violaters and their 
passengers. The United States Supreme Court makes clear that 
traffic stops are considered as dangerous and threatening in 
regards to possible assaults with weapons as investigating any 
other crime* United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 
(1973); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977). Regarding 
seizures of persons from their car, the Court views this as a 
de minimis intrusion that is not offensive to Terry. Mimms, at 
110, 111. In the present case, Richards had no choice but to 
remove Spidle from the car since it was being impounded. Hence, 
the inquiry on whether the seizure of Spidle was de minimis 
should focus on the asking of Spidle to open his coat. The 
State asserts that asking a person that had to be removed from 
a car, to open his coat, is as de minimis a seizure, and 
therefore proper, as the asking of a driver stopped for a 
traffic infraction, who need not exit his car, to exit the car, 
which was held in Mimms as proper. See also, People v. Bradi , 
supra. The fact that Richards had to face an unavoidable 
confrontation with Spidle, justified the brief stop to have 
Spidle open his coat to reveal any possible weapons. See, 
People v. McLaurin, 508 N.Y.S.2d 429 (A.D.I Dept. 1986); People 
v. Mack, 136 Cal.Rptr. 283 (App. 1977). 
This case may have been a routine traffic stop, but to 
imply that officers need not provide for their protection 
during routine traffic stops is to ignore the fact as stated in 
Robinson and Mimms, that traffic stops are as dangerous as any 
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criminal investigation. Here Richards had to deal with an 
unavoidable face to face confrontation with an intoxicated 
stranger of which Richards knew had a criminal record involving 
possession of controlled substances and burglary, Futhermore, 
it was long after sunset, and Spidle was wearing a thick army 
jacket that could easily conceal a weapon without a bulge. To 
expect Richards upon removing such a person from the car to 
turn his back and search the car for other open containers and 
any other possible contraband and not make precautions, against 
any possible assault from Spidle seems to push the 
reasonableness standard to the absurd. 
POINT II THE INITIAL NON-TOUCHING SEARCH OF 
APPELLANT WAS REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Although, in Terry v. Ohio, supra, the United States 
Supreme Court held specifically that an officer may conduct a 
pat down frisk of a person if based on the officer's 
experience, he can reasonably conclude he may be dealing with 
an armed and presently dangerous person, no pat down frisk 
occured in the present case prior to the marijuana packet 
falling to the ground. The Terry Court did recognize that 
" [n]o judicial opinion can comprehend the protean variety of 
the street encounter," hence each case must be judged on its 
own facts. Terry at 15. The Terry Court, nevertheless, put 
forth a test under which the various factual settings can be 
addressed. The Court stated: 
our inquiry is a dual one- whether the officer's 
action was justified at its inception, and 
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wnetfter it was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in 
the first place. 
Terry, at 20. 
The Court stated further, that the reasonableness of 
the intrusion is determined by balancing the need to search 
against the invasion the search intails. I_<3. at 21. Finally, 
the officer must justify the intrusion on specific, articulable 
facts which would warrant the particular intrusion. Ld. Hence, 
if the intrusion is minimal, the articulated.facts justifying 
the intrusion need only be minimal. 
In the present case, the official intrusion Spidle 
experienced before the marijuana was discovered was minimal. 
Spidle was merely asked to open his army jacket. In People v. 
De Bour, supra, which is cited by the defendant, the highest 
appellate court of New York, held, that the defendant, who 
while walking down the street late at night, crossed the street 
to avoid two police officers, constituted sufficient 
circumstances to justify the officers approaching the defendant 
and simply asking him to open his jacket upon seeing a bulge in 
his pocket. The De Bour court reasoned that the minimal 
intrusion of asking someone to open their jacket was justified 
by the attendant circumstances. Id. 
Spidle asserts that De Bour is inapplicable since De 
Bour had a bulge in his pocket and there was no bulge in 
Spidle's pocket. Spidle goes on to assert that Sibron v. New 
York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) should be controlling. Sibron deals 
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with an officer who verbally expressed that he was only 
searching the suspect for drugs, not weapons, and thrusted his 
hands into the suspects pocket. Ld. Other than restating the 
Terry analysis, Sibron is hardly applicable to the present 
case. De Bour on the other hand reveals that like the present 
case when no physical contact has occured and the request is 
only to open one's coat, the intrusion is minimal calling for 
minimal facts to justify the intrusion. The fact that no bulge 
was apparent on Sibron1s coat does not make De Bour meaningless 
to the present case. Sibron had on a heavy army coat that 
could easily conceal any weapon without a bulge. Furthermore, 
unlike De Bour, there are ample facts to justify a Terry frisk 
in the present case. Richards did not have the luxury to avoid 
a confrontation with Spidle. Spidle himself could have been 
cited for a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code. Spidle was a 
known burglar and had been in possession of drugs. Richards 
had to continue his investigation of the car without being able 
to watch Spidle's movements. In People v. Clements, 450 
N.Y.S.2d 326 (App.Div. 1982), a New York court held that an 
officer who after stopping a person for a traffic infraction, 
and rather than seeing a bulge in the defendant's pocket, 
merely discerned that the coat seemed weighted down on one 
side, then by touching the pocket of the coat, found a pistol, 
was minimally intrusive and proper. Certainly in the present 
case the behavior of officer Richards up to the time of 
discovering the marijauna was minimally intrusive and amply 
supported by the circumstances as reasonable. 
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Although the present case concerns a minimally 
intrusive search based on more than minimally reasonable facts, 
the facts articulated by Richards are sufficient to even 
justify a Terry frisk (of which Richards originally intended to 
perform). In Ammons v. State, 322 S.£.2d 543 (Ga.App. 1984), 
the officer, like in the present case, after removing the 
passenger from the car stopped for a traffic infraction, did 
not see any bulges in the defendant's coat pockets. The 
defendant like Spidle kept his hands in his coat pockets in a 
suspicious manner. The court held that asking the defendant to 
remove his hands from his pockets and then the officer 
conducting a Terry frisk was based on a reasonable suspicion 
that the defendant may be armed and dangerous. Id. 
Case law reveals that the fact that a person is a 
known drug dealer such as Spidle, it is a strong factor 
justifying a Terry search, even if the coat the suspect is 
wearing has no bulges. United States v. Del Toro, 464 F.2d 520 
(2nd Cir. 1972); State v. Sloughter, 545 P.2d 32 (Wash.App. 
1976), referring to State v. Pristell, 478 P.2d 743 (Wash.App. 
1970) . 
In United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 
1976), the fifth circuit upheld the Terry frisk of a passenger 
in a car who had been drinking, upon learning his name and 
thereby recognizing that the passenger was a known burglar. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that a person who 
was stopped for speeding was properly subjected to a Terry 
search due to a bulge under his coat and the reputation of the 
1 O 
individual of having prior convictions for drug possession. 
State v. Schneider, 389 N.W.2d 604 (N.D. 1986). 
This survey of case law reveals that a person's 
criminal reputation is a substantial factor in justifying a 
Terry frisk, particularly if it involves crimes such as 
burglary and narcotics. Furthermore, heavy coats whether a 
bulge exists or not can be an additional factor for an officer 
to articulate a suspicion that the person stopped may be 
armed. Applying these factors to the present case where the 
officer had no choice but to confront Spidle and then continue 
an investigation without the benefit of keeping an eye on 
Spidle1s behavior, even a Terry frisk if it occured before the 
marijuana was discovered would have been reasonable and 
proper. Since, the marijuana fell to the ground before a Terry 
frisk and upon a minimally intrusive request to open a heavy 
coat that was being suspiciously held together, there are ample 
circumstances which would make the minimally intrusive search 
reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Spidle was lawfully detained upon his removal from the 
car. Spidle himself was suspected of violating the Motor 
Vehicle Code and the officer pursuant to a reasonable beleif 
that Spidle may be armed and dangerous sought to conduct a 
Terry frisk. Before the Terry frisk was attempted, a 
minimally intrusive search uncovered the evidence. Since there 
were reasonable grounds for the Terry search, there were more 
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than adequate grounds to justify the less intrusive search 
which actually uncovered the evidence. Since the evidence is 
therefore admissible, the State asks that this Court deny 
Appellant's request to suppress the evidence and affirm the 
conviction. 
\ 
DATED this C, > — day of January, 1,988. 
T 
xM ^AQ. 
HOWAR0 L EMC ICE 
Attorney for Respondent 
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